Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action, the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive.
B-player when k co-players choose A. These payoffs can be represented as a table of the form:
88
Opposing A-players 0 1 . . . k . . . n − 1 payoff to A a 0 a 1 . . . a k . . . a n−1
Individuals implement mixed strategies, i.e., they play A with probability z (and B with probability 90 1 − z). The set of available strategies is then the interval [0, 1]. At any given time only two strategies are 91 present in the population: z and z + δ. Denoting by z • the strategy of a focal individual and by z (•) the 92 strategy of its -th co-player, the expected payoff π to the focal can be written as 93 π z • , z 1(•) , z 2(•) , ..., z n−1(•) = n−1 k=0 φ k z 1(•) , z 2(•) , . . . , z n−1 (•) 94 where φ k is the probability that exactly k co-players play action A. A first-order Taylor-series expansion 95 about the average strategy z • = n−1 =1 z (•) /(n − 1) of co-players shows that, to first order in δ, the 96 probability φ k is given by a binomial distribution with parameters n − 1 and z • , i.e., φ k z 1(•) , z 2(•) , . . . , z n−1(•) = n − 1 k z k • (1 − z • ) n−1−k + O(δ 2 ).
(2) 98 Substituting (2) into (1) and discarding second and higher order terms, we obtain
split into daughter groups and compete against each other (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006) , scaled relatedness 126 can be shown to be given by (Lehmann et al., 2007b) 127 κ = q − [2q/g + m/(ng)] m(ng − 1)/(ng) + q(n + g − 2)/g ,
3 Games between relatives 155 We start by deriving compact expressions for the direct effect −C(z), the indirect effect B(z), and the gain 156 function G(z) in terms of the payoffs a k and b k of the game. These expressions provide the foundation for 157 our subsequent analysis.
158
Imagine a focal individual playing B in a group where k of its co-players play A. Suppose that the 159 focal switches its action to A while co-players hold fixed their actions, thus changing its payoff from b k to 160 a k . As a consequence, the focal experiences a "direct gain from switching" given by 161 d k = a k − b k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
162 At the same time, each of the co-players playing A experiences a change in payoff given by ∆a k−1 = 163 a k − a k−1 and each of the co-players playing B experiences a change in payoff given by ∆b k = b k+1 − b k .
164
Taken as a block, co-players experience a change in payoff given by 165 e k = k∆a k−1 + (n − 1 − k)∆b k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1,
166 where we set a −1 = b n+1 = 0. From the focal's perspective, this change in payoffs represents an "indirect 167 gain from switching" to the focal if co-players are relatives. Adding up direct and indirect gains weighted 168 by κ allows us to define the "inclusive gains from switching" 169 f k = d k + κe k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, 170 in a group where k out of the n − 1 co-players play A. 171 We show in Appendix B that the direct, indirect, and net effects appearing in (4) are indeed given by 
177 that is, as the expected values of the relevant gains from switching when the number of co-players playing 178 A is distributed according to a binomial distribution with parameters n − 1 and z. 179 It follows from (10) that games between relatives are mathematically equivalent to transformed games 180 between unrelated individuals, where "inclusive payoffs" take the place of standard, or personal, payoffs.
Indeed, consider a game in which A-players and B-players respectively obtain payoffs in the formula for the gain function, and that evolutionary stability is understood as convergence stability.
194
For a large class of games, these results allow us to identify convergence stable strategies from a direct 195 inspection of the sign pattern of the inclusive gains from switching f k . Second, we can interpret the effect 196 of relatedness as inducing the payoff transformation a k → a k , b k → b k . For n = 2, such transformation is 197 the classic result of two-player games between relatives (Hamilton, 1971; Grafen, 1979; Day and Taylor, 198 1998)
where the payoff of the focal is augmented by adding κ times the payoff of the co-player. Let us now apply our model to the evolution of collective action. To this end, we let action A ("provide") 203 be associated with some effort in collective action, action B ("shirk") with no effort, and refer to A-players 204 as "providers" and to B-players as "shirkers". Each provider incurs a cost γ > 0 in order for a collective 205 good of value β j to be created, where j is the total number of providers. We assume that the collective 206 good fails to be created if no individual works (β 0 = 0), and that the value of the collective good β j is 207 increasing in the number of providers (∆β j = β j+1 − β j ≥ 0). We distinguish between three kinds of 208 collective goods, depending on which individuals have access to the good: (i) "public goods", (ii) "club 209 goods", and (iii) "charity goods". Fig. 1 illustrates these three kinds of collective goods and Table 1 210 provides the corresponding payoffs and gains from switching.
211
Economies of scale are incorporated in the model through the properties of the production function 212 β j . We investigate three functional forms ( Fig. 2 ): (i) linear (β j = βj for some β > 0, so that ∆β j is 213 constant), (ii) decelerating (∆β j is decreasing in j), and (iii) accelerating (∆β j is increasing in j). We also 214 say that returns to scale are respectively (i) constant, (ii) diminishing, or (iii) increasing. To illustrate 215 the effects of economies of scale, we consider the "geometric production function":
217 with β > 0 and λ > 0, for which returns to scale are constant when λ = 1, decreasing when λ < 1, and 218 increasing when λ > 1 (Fig. 2 ).
219
For all three kinds of collective goods, the indirect gains from switching are always nonnegative, hence 220 the indirect effect B(z) is nonnegative for all z. Consequently, participation in collective action is either 221 payoff altruistic or payoff cooperative, and the selection gradient is increasing in κ. The provision of 222 each kind of collective good however leads to a different collective action problem, as it is reflected in the 223 different payoff structures of the corresponding games (Table 1 ). In particular, while the provision of 224 charity goods is payoff altruistic for all z, the provision of public and club goods can be either payoff 225 altruistic or payoff cooperative, depending on the parameters of the game and the resident strategy z.
226
In the following, we characterize the evolutionary dynamics of each of these three kinds of collective 227 action problems and investigate the effects of (scaled) relatedness on the set of evolutionary attractors.
228
Although many of our results also extend to the case of negative relatedness, for simplicity we restrict 229 attention to nonnegative relatedness (κ ≥ 0). It will be shown that the evolutionary dynamics fall 230 into one of the following five dynamical regimes: (i) "null provision" (z = 0 is the only attractor), (ii) 231 "full provision" (z = 1 is the only attractor), (iii) "coexistence" (there is a unique singular strategy z * 232 which is attracting), (iv) "bistability" (z = 0 and z = 1 are both attracting, with a singular repeller z * 233 dividing their basins of attraction), and (v) "bistable coexistence" (z = 0 is attracting, z = 1 is repelling, To isolate the effects of the kind of collective good, we begin our analysis with the case where the 241 production function takes the linear form β j = βj, i.e., λ = 1 in (12). For all three kinds of collective 242 goods, the gain function can then be written as
The parameter C > 0 may be thought of as the "effective cost" per co-player of joining collective action 245 alone. We have C = γ/(n − 1) when a focal provider is not among the beneficiaries of the collective 246 good (charity goods) and C = (γ − β)/(n − 1) otherwise (public and club goods). The parameter B ≥ 0 247 measures the incremental benefit accruing to each co-player of a focal provider when none of the co-players 248 joins collective action. We thus have B = 0 for club goods and B = β otherwise. Finally, D is null for 249 public goods (D = 0), positive for club goods (D = β), and negative for charity goods (D = −β).
250
Depending on the values of these parameters, we obtain the following characterization of the resulting 251 evolutionary dynamics: inclusive gains from switching given in Table 1 into (10) we obtain
276
If the production function is decelerating, ∆β k is decreasing in k, implying that G(z) is decreasing in 
The effect of relatedness on the evolution of public goods provision can be better grasped by noting 286 that multiplying and dividing (14) , 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Peña et al., 2014) .
292
Hence, the effects of relatedness can be understood as affecting only the cost of cooperation, while leaving 293 economies of scale and patterns of frequency dependence unchanged.
294
To illustrate the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games, consider a geometric production 295 function (12) with λ = 1 (see Table 2 for a summary of the results and Appendix C for a derivation). We 296 find that there are two critical cost-to-benefit ratios:
298 such that for small costs (γ/β ≤ ε) there is full provision and for large costs (γ/β ≥ ϑ) there is null 299 provision. For intermediate costs (ε < γ/β < ϑ), there is a singular strategy given by
301 such that there is coexistence if returns to scale are diminishing (λ < 1) and bistability if returns to scale 302 are increasing (λ > 1). For a given cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β, higher relatedness makes the region in the 303 parameter space where cooperation (resp. defection) dominates larger (resp. smaller). Moreover, z * is an 304 increasing (resp. decreasing) function of κ when λ < 1 (resp. λ > 1), meaning that the proportion of 305 providers at the internal attractor (resp. the size of the basin of attraction of z = 1) is larger for higher κ 306 ( Fig. 3 .a and 3.d ). the evolutionary dynamics are qualitatively identical to those arising from linear production functions: 314 for low relatedness, there is null provision; for high relatedness, there is bistability (see Fig. 3 .e for an 315 illustration and Appendix D.1 for proofs).
316
If the production function is decelerating, the indirect gains from switching e k may still be increasing 317 in k because the incremental benefit ∆β k accrues to a larger number of recipients as k increases. In such 318 a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively identical 319 to those arising when economies of scale are absent. A different picture emerges if the number of 320 players is greater than two and returns to scale are diminishing. In this case, B(z) can be negative 321 frequency-dependent for some z, and hence (for sufficiently high values of κ) so can be G(z). Depending 322 on the value of relatedness, which modulates how the frequency dependence of B(z) interacts with that of 323 C(z), and on the particular shape of the production function, this can give rise to evolutionary dynamics 324 different from those discussed in Section 4.1. In particular, bistable coexistence is possible.
325
As an example, consider the geometric production function (12) with λ = 1 (see Table 2 for a summary 326 of results and Appendix D.2 for proofs). Defining the critical returns-to-scale value their locations can be obtained by searching for roots of G(z) in the interval (0, 1), as we illustrate in Fig.   339 3.b and Fig. 3 .e.
340
The critical values ξ, ς, and τ are all increasing functions of κ ≥ 0. Hence, with larger relatedness κ, 341 the regions of the parameter space where some level of collective action is convergence stable expand 342 at the expense of the region of dominant nonprovision. Moreover, inside these regions the convergence 343 stable positive probability of providing increases with κ ( Fig. 3.b ). When the production function is 344 "sufficiently" decelerating (λ < ξ) and for intermediate cost-to-benefit ratios (ς < γ/β < τ ), relatedness 345 and economies of scale interact in a nontrivial way, leading to saddle-node bifurcations whereby two 346 singular strategies appear as κ increases (Fig. 3.b ). For charity goods the direct gains from switching d k (cf. and Fig. 3.c) .
358
If the production function is accelerating, the indirect gains from switching e k may still be decreasing in 359 k because the incremental benefit ∆β k accrues to a smaller number of recipients (n − 1 − k) as k increases. bistable coexistence. For a concrete example, consider again the geometric production function (12) with 366 λ = 1 (see Table 2 for a summary of results, and Appendix E.2 for proofs). In this case, the evolutionary 367 dynamics for n > 2 depend on the critical value
369 and on the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios 370 ζ = κ(n − 1), and η = 1
371 which satisfy > 1 and ζ < η.
372
With these definitions our results can be stated as follows. For λ ≤ the dynamical outcome depends 373 on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to ζ. If γ/β ≥ ζ (high costs), there is null provision, while longer a free-rider but a coordination problem (i.e., individuals might prefer to stay alone rather than join a risky collective activity). Thirdly, charity goods (only shirkers use the good) for which the collective 461 action problem takes the form of an altruism problem (i.e., individuals would prefer to enjoy the collective 462 good rather than provide it for others). 463 We showed that relatedness can help solving each of these collective action problems, but that such 464 effect takes different forms, depending on the kind of good and on its economies of scale. Simply put: 
where the second equality follows from exchangeability, µ = E [O i ] is the expected number of offspring 578 descending from any founder i, and σ 2 = E (O i − µ) 2 is the corresponding variance. Due to the fact 579 that the total number of offspring is fixed, we also necessarily have µ = N o /N (i.e.,
which holds for any neutral growth process.
583
We now consider three different cases: In the following we establish the expressions for −C(z) and B(z) given in (9); the expression for G(z) (10) 605 is then immediate from the definition of f k (8) and the identity G(z) = −C(z) + κB(z).
606
Recalling the definitions of C(z) and B(z) from (4) as well as the definitions of d k and e k from (6)- (7) 607 we need to show
where the function π has been defined in (3). (B.1) follows directly by taking the partial derivative of π 612 with respect to z • and evaluating at z • = z • = z, so it remains to establish (B.2).
613
Our derivation of (B.2) uses properties of polynomials in Bernstein form. Such polynomials, which in 614 general can be written as
Applying this property to (3) and evaluating the resulting partial derivative at z
In order to obtain (B.2) from (B.3) it then suffices to establish
as applying these identities to the terms on the right side of (B.3) yields the right side of (B.2).
625
Let us prove (B.4) ((B.5) is proven in a similar way). Starting from the left side of (B.4), we multiply 626 and divide by m/(k + 1) and distribute x to obtain
Applying the identity r k = r k r−1 k−1 and changing the index of summation to k = k + 1, we get
Finally, changing the lower index of the sum by noting that the summand is zero when k = 0 gives (B.4).
631
C Public goods games with geometric production function 632 For a geometric production function, we have ∆β k = βλ k , so that the inclusive gains from switching for 633 public goods games are given by f k = −γ + [1 + κ(n − 1)] βλ k . Substituting this expression into (10) and 634 using the formula for the probability generating function of a binomial random variable, we obtain 635
of the production function (12) and substitute them into 682 ∆f k = ∆β k+1 + κ (k + 1)∆ 2 β k + ∆β k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 2, 683 to obtain 684 ∆f k = βλ k [λ(1 + κ) + κ(λ − 1)k] , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 2.
685
For λ < 1, the sequence ∆f k is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover, 686 as ∆f 0 = βλ(1 + κ) > 0 always holds true, the initial sign of ∆f k is positive and whether or not the 687 sequence ∆f k has a sign change depends solely on how ∆f n−2 compares to zero. Observe, too, that for 688 λ < 1 we have ς > 1 as λ n < λ holds.
689
Consider the case ξ ≤ λ < 1. By the definition of ξ (18) this implies ∆f n−2 ≥ 0. In this case ∆f k 690 has no sign changes and f k is nondecreasing. The sign pattern of the inclusive gain sequence can then 691 be determined by looking at how the signs of its endpoints depend on the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. If 692 γ/β ≤ 1, then f 0 ≥ 0, implying that f k has no sign changes and its initial sign is positive. If γ/β ≥ ς, 693 then f n−1 ≤ 0 and hence f k has no sign changes and its initial sign is negative. If 1 < γ/β < ς, then 694 f 0 < 0 < f n−1 , i.e., f k has one sign change and its initial sign is negative. Result 2.1 then follows from For charity goods games, the inclusive gains from switching are given by
(E.1) (a) If γ/β < ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence 736 stable strategy z * ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).
737
(b) If γ/β ≥ ζ, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
738
2. If λ > , G(z) is unimodal in z with mode given byẑ = κ[(n−2)λ−(n−1)]−1 [1+κ(n−1)](λ−1) . Furthermore:
739
(a) If γ/β ≤ ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence 740 stable strategyẑ < z * < 1 (coexistence).
741
(b) If ζ < γ/β < η, there are two singular strategies z L and z R satisfying 0 < z L <ẑ < z R < 1.
742
The strategies z = 0 and z R are convergence stable, whereas z L and z = 1 are convergence 743 unstable (bistable coexistence).
744
(c) If γ/β ≥ η, then z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
745
The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for 746 club goods games with geometric production function (Result 2 in Appendix D). Observing that > 1 747 holds for κ ≥ 0 and that the case λ = 1 (constant returns to scale) is trivial, we can prove this result by 748 considering three cases: (i) λ < 1, (ii) 1 < λ ≤ , and (iii) < λ.
749
For λ < 1, the production function is decelerating and hence Result 3 applies with ∆β 0 = β. Recalling 750 the definition of ζ = κ(n − 1) from (21) and rearranging, this yields Result 4.1 for the case λ ≤ 1 < .
751
To obtain the result for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences 752 of the benefit sequence (12) and substitute them into 
765
For λ > we have ∆f 0 > 0, implying that ∆f k has one sign change from + to −, i.e., f k is unimodal.
766
This implies that the gain function G(z) is also unimodal with its modeẑ being determined by G (ẑ) = 0 767 (Peña et al., 2014, Section 3.4.3) . Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) in 768 closed form as 
Using (9a) and the fact that a k − b k = −γ, we have that the direct benefit is given by −C(z) = −γ.
If κ ≤ 0, our assumption that the production function β k is increasing implies that G(z) is always 793 negative, so that z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).
794
To analyze the case where κ ≥ 0, it is convenient to observe that (F.1) is of a similar form as (14).
795
The only differences are that the summation in (F.1) extends from 0 to n − 2 (rather than to n − 1) and 796 that the term multiplying the incremental benefit ∆β k is given by κ(n − 1) (rather than by 1 + κ(n − 1)). in z (negative frequency dependence). There is null provision if γ ≥ κ(n − 1)∆β 0 , and full provision if 803 γ ≤ κ(n − 1)∆β n−2 . If κ(n − 1)∆β n−2 < γ < κ(n − 1)∆β 0 holds, there is coexistence. With increasing 804 returns to scale, the gain function is increasing in z (positive frequency dependence). There is null provision 805 if γ ≥ κ(n − 1)∆β n−2 , and full provision if γ ≤ κ(n − 1)∆β 0 . If κ(n − 1)∆β 0 < γ < κ(n − 1)∆β n−2 , there 806 is bistability.
807
If the production function is geometric (12), the gain function is given by 808 G(z) = −γ + κ(n − 1)β(1 − z + λz) n−2 , 809 so that, for λ = 1, the evolutionary dynamics are similar to the case of public goods games after redefining 810 the critical cost-to-benefit ratios as 811 ε = min κ(n − 1), λ n−2 κ(n − 1) and ϑ = max κ(n − 1), λ n−2 κ(n − 1) 812 and letting Figure 1 : Three kinds of collective goods. Providers (A) and shirkers (B) interact socially. Providers (e.g., vigilants, cooperative hunters, or sterile workers) work together to create a collective good (e.g., alarm calls, increased hunting success, or nest defense), which can be used exclusively by a subset of individuals in the group (filled circles). Shirkers do not make any effort in collective action. a, Public goods (both providers and shirkers use the good). b, Club goods (only providers use the good). c, Charity goods (only shirkers use the good). Figure 2 : Linear, decelerating and accelerating production functions (here, geometric production functions as given by (12) with different values for the returns-to-scale parameter λ). Left panel, benefits β j from the collective good are additive for linear functions, subadditive for decelerating functions and superadditive for accelerating functions. Right panel, incremental benefits ∆β j from the collective good are constant for linear functions (constant returns to scale), decreasing for decelerating functions (diminishing returns to scale), and increasing for accelerating functions (increasing returns to scale). Figure 3 : Bifurcation plots illustrating the evolutionary dynamics of collective action for public (a, d ), club (b, e), and charity (c, f ) goods with geometric production function. The scaled relatedness coefficient κ ≥ 0 serves as a control parameter. Arrows indicate the direction of evolution for the probability of providing. Solid lines stand for convergence stable equilibria; dashed lines for convergence unstable equilibria. a, b, c, Diminishing returns to scale (λ = 0.7) and low cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 3.5). d, e, f, Increasing returns to scale (λ = 1.25) and high cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 15). In all plots, n = 20. The central arrows, for which κ = 0.5, could correspond, for example, to a group splitting model with infinitely many groups (g → ∞) and splitting probability equal to the migration rate q = m (5), or to a particular case of the haystack model with two founders (A.5).
kind of good payoffs to A (a k ) Table 1 : Payoff structures and gains from switching for the three classes of collective action problems. In each case providers incur a cost γ > 0 to create a collective good of value β j ≥ 0, where j is the number of providers in the group. The number of providers experienced by a focal is j = k if the focal is a shirker (action B), and j = k + 1 if it is a provider (action A). Direct gains (d k ) and indirect gains (e k ) are calculated by substituting the formulas for a k and b k into (6) and (7). Inclusive gains from switching (f k ) are then obtained from (8) Table 2 : Dynamical regimes of collective action for the case of geometric production functions. The dynamical outcome depends on the type of good, the magnitude of the returns-to-scale parameter λ, and the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. The results hold for κ ≥ 0 and n > 2. The critical cost-to-benefit ratios are given by ζ = κ(n − 1), ε = min(1 + ζ, λ n−1 (1 + ζ)), ϑ = max(1 + ζ, λ n−1 (1 + ζ)), η = [1/(λ − 1)] 1 + λκ [(n − 2)λκ/(1 + ζ)] n−2 , ς = (1 − λ n )/(1 − λ) + ζλ n−1 , τ = [1/(1 − λ)] 1 + λκ [(n − 2)κ/(1 + ζ)] n−2 . The critical returns-to-scale parameters are ξ = κ(n − 2)/[1 + κ(n − 1)] and = 1/ξ.
